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PERJURY BY OMISSION
IRA P. ROBBINS*
ABSTRACT

"Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth? " There arefew legalphrases that the layperson can repeat verbatim;
this is one of them. But how many people truly understandthe nuances and
ramifications of testifying under oath? Many assume that if they do not
provide the "whole truth" under oath, they will face a perjury charge.
However, perjury is a charge often threatenedbut rarely used The offense
requires that the defendant willfully and knowingly make afalse statement,
under oath, regardinga materialfact.
The federalperjury statute does not contemplate a scenario in which a
defendant (or declarant, deponent, witness, or interviewee) withholds
truthful information in an attempt to mislead the questioner and alter the
outcome of a judicialproceeding-in sum, not telling the "whole truth."
But, in Bronston v. United States, the Supreme Court consideredjust this
situation, holding that the language of the federal perjury statute does not
contemplate a defendant who intentionally omits material information.
Instead, the Court broadly ruled that "literally truthful " answers are
categoricallyforbiddenfrom being the basis of perjury. The Courtplaced
the burden on the questioner to elicit the desired answer from a witness
when confronted with a literally truthful, yet unresponsive and misleading
answer. Such an onus suggests that all questionerspossess the abilitiesofa
mind reader.
This Article demonstrates that the Bronston Court created unforeseen
consequences. Currently, a sophisticated defendant can dodge a perjury
charge by providing a literally true answer while omitting pertinent
information. Sometimes, these answers communicate a lie, but as long as
they are literally truthful under the Bronston Court's broad interpretation,
a defendant could neverface a perjury charge. Congress can fill the holes
ofthis decision by amending thefederalperjury statutes to criminalizethose
who intentionally give incomplete or misleading responses regarding
material information under oath.
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INTRODUCTION

In September 2018, Americans gathered around their televisions or
computer monitors to watch members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
question then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh and Dr. Christine Blasey Ford. Judge
Kavanaugh had recently been nominated to the Supreme Court, motivating
Dr. Ford to publicly accuse him of physically and sexually assaulting her in
the 1980s.1 For the Committee to gather potentially useful information in
1.
See Eli Watkins, Timeline: How the Kavanaugh Accusations Have Unfolded, CNN (Sept. 17,
2018,
4:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/kavanaugh-ford-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZR4-Zj9Y] (describing how Judge Kavanaugh agreed to answer senators' questions
in order to refute allegations of physical and sexual abuse against him).
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Judge Kavanaugh's confirmation process, both Dr. Ford and Judge
Kavanaugh willingly participated in a hearing.2 At this hearing, each senator
had five minutes to question Dr. Ford and Judge Kavanaugh, who were both
under oath, in order to elicit information regarding the allegations. 3 Due to
this time restraint, it was important that both witnesses answer each question
as directly and truthfully as possible. When it was Judge Kavanaugh's turn,
however, he often used evasive, unresponsive answers, which derailed the
senators' lines of questioning and frustrated their ability to get the answers
they desired.4 By providing irrelevant answers, and sometimes even asking
the senators questions instead of answering theirs, 6 Judge Kavanaugh
managed to avoid revealing certain information. His testimony is an
example of an educated person who has seemingly exploited the broad
confines of perjury by providing useless answers under oath.
This is not the first time a public official has used slight ambiguity 7 to
avoid admitting unfavorable information about himself. During a deposition
regarding the Paula Jones lawsuit, President Bill Clinton was asked about
his now-infamous relationship with Monica Lewinsky.5 President Clinton
was able to infuse ambiguity into the provided definition of "sexual
relations" in order to avoid divulging information regarding his physical

2.

Id

3.

See Phil Mattingly & Kate Sullivan, What Thursday's Hearing with Kavanaugh and Ford

Will Look Like, CNN (Sept. 25, 2018, 10:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/politics/thursdayhearing-format-kavanaugh-ford/index.html [https://perma.cc/HK3H-DYH2] (explaining that, at the
testimony, "[tihere will be one round of questions in which each senator will have five minutes each to
ask Ford questions").
See Kate Sullivan, Kavanaugh's Yale Classmate. 'There Were Omissions' in Testimony
4.

About His College Drinking, CNN (Oct. 1, 2018, 7:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/01/politics/
yale-kavanaugh-drinking-ludington/index.htmI [https://perma.cc/BXU2-N2RY] (reporting that "Chad
Ludington, who went to Yale with Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh, said 'there were
omissions' in the nominee's testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Thursday about his drinking

in college").
In response to the following question by Senator Leahy: "So you don't know-you don't
5.
know whether that's you [in Mark Judge's book] or not?," then-Judge Kavanaugh responded, "we can
sit here and you (ph) like (ph), make-make fun of some guy who has an addiction." Bloomberg Gov't,
Kavanaugh Hearing. Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.co
[https://per
m/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utmterm=.72d4ba2bcl83

ma.cc/LGS8-WCD7].
Senator Klobuchar asked the following: "So you're saying there's never been a case where
6.
you drank so much that you didn't remember what happened the night before, or part of what happened,"
to which Judge Kavanaugh responded: "It's-you're asking about, you know, blackout. I don't know.
Have you?" Id.
Career prosecutor Rachel Mitchell asked: "OK. Have you ever passed out from drinking?"
7.
Kavanaugh responded: "I-passed out would be-no, but I've gone to sleep, but- but I've never
blacked out." Id.
8.
President Clinton's Deposition,WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/clintondep031398.htm [https:/perma.cc/LP9G-QY53].
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relationship with her. 9 In doing so, he avoided a perjury charge because,
based on his own definition of "sexual relations," he was telling the truth.' 0
This Article is not accusing now-Justice Kavanaugh or President Clinton
of perjury. Instead, it is suggesting that their testimonies are examples of
holes in the current perjury statute because they illustrate circumstances in
which sophisticated individuals can omit material information under oath
without facing perjury charges. Currently, a defendant commits perjury by
giving a false statement under oath." As the Supreme Court case Bronston
v. United States 1 2 established, if a defendant's statement is literally true,
even if he or she intends to mislead the questioner, the defendant cannot be
convicted under the federal perjury statutes.' 3 Therefore, "a wily witness"
can avoid truthfully answering a question by providing an answer that
appears truthful but actually omits material information and sometimes even
produces a lie by negative implication. 14
By expanding the federal perjury statute, Congress would discourage
individuals like Judge Kavanaugh and President Clinton from refusing to
provide material information under oath. Congress could eliminate existing
loopholes by amending the federal perjury statute to encompass perjury by
omission. Under this amended statute, a defendant would commit perjury
by omission by leaving out material information when providing a literally
true answer to an unambiguous question with the intent to mislead the
questioner.
This Article asserts that Congress should expand the federal definition
of perjury to include omissions and half-truths, thereby closing the loophole
created in Bronston. Part L.A of the Background explores the historical
development of perjury and examines its current form in federal perjury
statutes. Next, Part I.B discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Bronston,
which solidified the "literal truth" defense. Further, this Part explains the
Court's assumptions regarding the questioner's acuity and details what a
jury can infer, as well as how lower courts have distinguished Bronston's
holding. Moreover, Part I.B defines the various types of unresponsive
answers and outlines the ethical rules relevant to perjury. Part I.C concludes
the Background section by highlighting instances in which silence and
omissions carry substantive meaning in the law.
Part II of this Article argues that the federal statute should encompass
perjury by omission. First, Part II.A asserts that the literal truth defense
9.
See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (providing details regarding President
Clinton's deposition).
10.
See infra Part II.A (explaining how President Clinton avoided a perjury charge).

11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part I.A.2 (defining pejury).
409 U.S. 352 (1973).
Id at 360.
Id.
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developed by the Bronston Court created a loophole for sophisticated
defendants. Next, Part II.B proposes that the federal perjury statute should
be expanded to include perjury by omission, thus remedying the loophole.
Accordingly, Part II.B demonstrates what juries would be permitted to infer
under an expanded perjury statute. Further, this Part illustrates how the
current statute and the literal truth defense might implicate an attorney's
ethical obligations. Finally, Part II.C utilizes state statutes that contemplate
perjury by omission as a foundation to recommend a revised federal statute,
with accompanying jury instructions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Perjury
1. The Early History of Perjury
Perjury traces its roots as far back as the Old Testament and has evolved
with society." In early civilizations, "[t]he judge, be he elder, chief, priest,
king, or professional, was a surrogate for divine intervention." 6 However,
society was skeptical that these judges would sufficiently deter individuals
from lying, so participants in a trial were required to take an oath invoking
the deity to ensure that they would be punished for lying-whether it be in
their lifetime or the next.1 7 The notion that witnesses must give completely
truthful answers, or they will be punished for bearing false witness, is crosscultural.'"
The common law crime of perjury appeared much later when the Perjury
Statute of 1563 made perjury by witnesses a punishable crime. 19 This statute
defined perjury as "a deliberate lie" made in a courtroom and was the
15.

See Richard H. Underwood, False Witness: A Lawyer's History of the Law of Perjury, 10

ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 215-16 (1993).
Id. at 217.
16.
See id. By the mid-thirteenth century, juries were being used to resolve disputes. See Bradley
17.
L. Brown, A Different Light: The Evolution of Our System for Dispute Resolution, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Dec. 1997, at 41, 41. Early juries did not hear evidence and only sought divine help when making
decisions. Id. Slowly, juries were allowed to talk to litigants and witnesses, and with the passing of the
Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, juries became a tool used to determine the
truth in contested disputes rather than to enact God's judgment. Id.
18.
See Underwood, supra note 15, at 218-33 (referencing instances of false witnesses and
punishment in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, Greece, and Rome, as well as in the Bible).
19.
See Alan Heinrich, Clinton's Little White Lies: The MaterialityRequirementfor Perjury in

Civil Discovery, 32 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1303, 1305-06 (1999); see also Michael D. Gordon, The
Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjuryand the Elizabethan Courts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145,
145-46 (1980) (citing T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 436 (5th ed.
1956)). The statute could not have taken effect before the sixteenth century, as witnesses did not formally
exist before this time. Id. at 46 (quoting S. F. C. MILSON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE
COMMON LAW 366 (1969)).
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support for perjury charges throughout the nineteenth century. 2 0 In early
English law, the perjury charge was used against individuals who had taken
on a party oath or wager of law. 2 ' The modem federal perjury statutes,
which have not changed much since the framing of the Constitution, are
mostly derived from English common law.22
2. The Modern FederalPerjury Statutes
The modem federal perjury statutes criminalize intentionally making
false statements under oath. There are three federal perjury statutessections 1621, 1622, and 1623.23 Section 1621, the general perjury statute,
applies to a broad range of circumstances.2 4 It provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever-(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person ... that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify
truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or
certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such
oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification,
or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746
of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any
material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of
21
perury ....
In sum, a person commits perjury under § 1621 when he or she testifies
under oath or affirmation and "gives false testimony concerning a material
matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony." 2 6 For a person to
commit perjury, he or she must take an oath "before a competent tribunal,
officer, or person" and willingly state false information that is material to

20.
Roberto Suro & Bill Miller, Perjury:A Tough Case to Make, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/perjury092498.htmn?noredirect
=on [https://perma.cc/SE9M-6FJB] (referencing the Perjury Statute of 1563 when discussing the Clinton
impeachment case); J. Kevin Quinn et al., Resisting the IndividualisticFlavor of Opposition to Model
Rule 3.3, 8 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 901, 930-31 (1995).
21.
See Brown, supra note 17, at 41. Under wager of law, litigants must produce a certain number
of witnesses, known as compurgators, to testify on their behalf under oath. Id. The wager of law was
won if the right number of witnesses adequately testified under oath. Id.
22.
See Underwood, supra note 15, at 245-47 (noting some discrepancies between the perjury
charge in England and the United States); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, PERJURY
UNDER FEDERAL LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 (2010). The notable change to the perjury statutes is that
they now cover more than court proceedings. Id. See also infra Part I.A.2 (defining perjury).

23.

See 18 U.S.C.

§§

1621, 1622, 1623 (2012). Section 1622, which criminalizes the subomation

of perjury, is outside the scope of this Article.

24.
25.
26.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1).
Id. § 1621.
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).
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the case.2 7 Therefore, false statements made "as a result of confusion,
mistake, or faulty memory" are not sufficient grounds for peijury.2 8
Section 1623, written more narrowly than § 1621, only applies "in any
proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States." 29 It provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification,
or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746
of title 28, United States Code) . . . knowingly makes any false
material declaration or makes or uses any other information,
including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other
material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.3 0
In other words, a person commits perjury under § 1623 when he or she
makes a false declaration under oath in "any proceeding before or ancillary
to any court or grand jury" that is material to the case.3 1 Section 1623 does
not apply in any proceeding "less formal than a deposition." 32 Therefore, §
1623 applies to a smaller range of circumstances than the general perjury
statute. Both §§ 1621 and 1623, however, have several common elements:
oath, intent, materiality, and falsity.
While the two perjury statutes share the foregoing elements, they differ
slightly in their mens rea requirements. Section 1621 requires that the
government show that a defendant willfully provided testimony that he or
she knew was false. 3 3 By contrast, § 1623 requires only that the government
prove that a defendant knew his or her statement to be false.34
Additionally, the federal perjury statutes require different burdens of
proof. Under § 1621, the government must satisfy the two-witness rule,
which is an evidentiary requirement, in order to prevail on a perjury

27.
28.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94.

29.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Section 1623 was enacted as part of the 1970 Organized Crime Control
Act to ensure reliable testimony before federal courts and grand juries. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S.

100, 107-09 (1979).
§ 1623(a).
30.
Id. § 1623.
31.
32.
Dunn, 442 U.S. at 113.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1); see also Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94 (stating that
33.

§

1621 requires

"willful intent to provide false testimony").

34.
that

§

See

§

1623(a); see also United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting

1623 "has a reduced mens rea requiring only that one 'knowingly' commit perjury rather than

'willfully').
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conviction.3 5 The rule is a misnomer, however, as it does not explicitly
require two separate witnesses to uphold a perjury charge; instead, the rule
allows the government to provide testimony of one witness coupled with
sufficient corroborative evidence.36 The rule is frequently criticized, but the
Supreme Court has upheld it, concluding that it alleviates innocent
witnesses' fear of prosecution.3 7
Conversely, Congress expressly prohibited the use of the two-witness
rule in § 1623, allowing a conviction of perjury based on the testimony of
only one witness. 38 Accordingly, the government's burden of proof under §
1623 requires less than the government's burden of proof under § 1621.
Further, although § 1623 no longer has the two-witness rule, the statute does
provide for a recantation defense, which is not available under § 1621.3
Under the recantation defense, a defendant may retract a statement made
under oath to avoid a perjury prosecution.40 Notably, attorneys rarely use
this defense successfully because the recantation defense "appears to be an
illusion---often asserted but never found."4 1
B. Bronston and the Literal Truth Defense
The Supreme Court profoundly impacted the landscape of perjury law
for the first time when it established the literal truth defense in Bronston v.
United States.4 2 In Bronston, Samuel Bronston, the owner of a production
company, was charged with perjury under § 1621 based on testimony he
made during a Chapter 11 examination before a bankruptcy referee. 4 3 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
35.

See, e.g., United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373, 1374 (7th Cir. 1994); Mary T. Hall, The

Two- Witness Rule in FalsificationOffenses: Going, Going, But Still Not Gone, ARMY LAW., May 1989,
at II (discussing the two-witness rule in the context of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

36.

See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding a

defendant's prior sworn testimony to be sufficient corroborative evidence).

37.

See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 608-4)9 (1945). Early common law did not require

that the government prove perjury by using more than one witness. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2032 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1978). However, in the 1600s, courts in
England required the oath of two "witnesses" to prove falsity, and common law courts and American

jurisprudence adopted the practice. United States v. Hogue, 42 M.J. 533, 534-35 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
1995). In 1945, the government argued that the Supreme Court should abolish the two-witness rule. See

Weiler, 323 U.S. at 608.
38.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (stating that "[i]t shall not be necessary that such proof [under this
section] be made by any particular number of witnesses").
39.
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (prohibiting a perjury prosecution if the defendant admits the
statement was false in the same proceeding), with 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (providing no such defense).
40.
See Linda F. Harrison, Recantation:Illusion or Reality?, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 637, 644
(2006) (enumerating the conditions that must be satisfied in order to use the recantation defense).

41.
United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d
Cir. 2003).
409 U.S. 352 (1973).
42.
43.
United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555, 556 (2d. Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
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ultimately convicted Bronston of perjury.44 The conviction rested on the
following testimony that Bronston gave under oath during the bankruptcy
hearing:

Q. Do

you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich.45
At the time of the questioning, Bronston had no personal Swiss bank
accounts. 46 However, Bronston previously had a personal bank account in
Geneva, Switzerland between October 1959 and June 1964, which he failed
to disclose to the bankruptcy trustee.47
Bronston appealed his perjury conviction, claiming that the question,
"Have you ever?" was ambiguous or, alternatively, that his answer was true
and could not form the basis of a perjury conviction. 4 8 The Second Circuit
affirmed Bronston's conviction for perjury, finding that witnesses should
not be able to intentionally mislead questioners with half-truths. 49 While
acknowledging that courts have held that a "literally accurate, technically
responsive, or legally truthful" answer cannot be the basis for a perjury
conviction,50 the Second Circuit held that a half-true answer that
intentionally contains a "lie by negative implication" could constitute
perjury under § 1621.51 Although Bronston's answer was literally true
because he communicated truthfully that the company previously had a
Swiss bank account, the court concluded that the jury should be able to
determine whether Bronston was aware of the underlying falsity of his
answer at the time he made it. 5 2 Affirming his conviction, the court found

44.

$2,000).
45.
46.

See id. at 556 (stating that Bronston was sentenced to six months of probation and fined

Bronston, 409 U.S. at 354.
Id.

47.
Id.; see also Bronston, 453 F.2d at 557 (explaining that it was never disputed that Bronston's
company had a Swiss bank account, but the jury found that he intentionally left out information about
his personal bank accounts).
Bronston, 453 F.2d at 558 (arguing that "the question upon which his conviction is predicated
48.
was misleading, imprecise and suggestive of various interpretations").

49.
50.
51.

Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 557 (citing Blumenfeld v. United States, 306 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1962)).
Id at 559.

52.
Id. at 558 (recognizing the importance of the defendant's intent at the time he made his
statement).
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"

that "the jury could have inferred that Bronston willfully gave false and
evasive testimony."
The Supreme Court reversed, invalidating Bronston's perjury conviction
because his answer, while misleading and unresponsive, was literally true.54
Reading § 1621 as requiring a witness to willfully make a false statement,
the Court refused to expand the interpretation of the statute to include
intentionally misleading but truthful statements.
Because courtroom
testimony is not "casual conversation," the Court would not allow juries to
infer negative implications from non-responsive answers.56 Instead, the
Court placed the burden on questioners to "recognize the [witness's]
evasion" and "bring the witness back to the mark."5 ' The Court reasoned
that if juries could determine a defendant's intent to mislead a questioner,
witnesses would be faced with too high a burden and feel discouraged from
testifying." Thus, this Supreme Court decision created the broad literal truth
defense.5 9
1. The Literal Truth Defense and Questioner'sAcuity
The literal truth defense forbids using a literally true but unresponsive
statement to form the basis of a perjury conviction. 60 The purpose of the
defense is to protect witnesses who misunderstand a question while
permitting the law to punish individuals who clearly lie.6 ' In creating the
literal truth defense, the Court noted that it is not surprising for witnesses to
give answers that are not "entirely responsive" under the "pressures and

53.
54.

Id. at 560.
See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360, 362 (1973) (holding that "the perjury

statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in
derailing the questioner-so long as the witness speaks the literal truth").
55.
See id. at 357-58 (stating that the federal perjury statute "does not make it a criminal act for
a witness to willfully state any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe
to be true").

56.

Id.

57.
Id. at 358-59 (holding that "[iut is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial
interrogation, and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry. If a
witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility . . to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary
examination").
58.
See id. at 359 ("[T]he measures taken against [perjury] must not be so severe as to discourage
witnesses from appearing or testifying." (quoting Study of Perjury, reprintedin Report of New York

Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc. No. 60, at 249 (1935))).
59.
Some courts report that Bronston created both the "literal truth" defense and also the "stark
contrast rule." See, e.g., United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998) (asserting that the
"stark contrast" rule and the "literal truth" defense both had their genesis in Bronston, and that Bronston
required a "'stark contrast' between the 'truth portion' and [the] allegedly false testimony").

60.

See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362.

61.

Paul Rosenzweig, Truth, Privileges,Perjury, and the Criminal Law, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL.

153, 165 (2002).
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tensions of interrogation." 62 Although the Court acknowledged that it might
be possible for an unresponsive answer to mislead a questioner, 6 3 it
ultimately concluded that unresponsive answers should alert the questioner
to continue his inquiry until obtaining the desired information. 64 When the
questioner fails to do so, a defendant can take advantage of this defense and
utilize it even when he intended to mislead the questioner or provided an
answer that created a false-negative implication.6 5
Lower courts are often asked to analyze Bronston's literal truth defense
along with the fundamental ambiguity defense.66 The fundamental
ambiguity defense is raised when the question is so clearly ambiguous that
there is no basis for a perjury conviction.6 1 While no clear definition details
what constitutes "fundamentally ambiguous," courts generally agree that if
"men of ordinary intelligence" recognize, based on the circumstances and
context, a mutual understanding of the question, then it is not fundamentally
ambiguous. 6 8 A questioner and answerer do not have a mutual
understanding of a fundamentally ambiguous question unless the
62.

Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358.

Id. at 361-62 n.5 (explaining that "the questioner may conclude that the unresponsive answer
63.
is given only because it is intended to make a statement-a negative statement-relevant to the question
asked").
See id. at 358-59 (explaining that "it is the lawyer's responsibility to recognize the evasion
64.
and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary
examination"); see also id. at 360 (determining that the questioner bears the burden "of pin[ning] the
witness down to the specific object of [his] inquiry").

65.
66.

See id. at 362.
See, e.g., United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that Bronston's

literal truth defense "does not apply in cases in which 'the focus is on the ambiguity of the question

asked"' (quoting United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 92 (1st Cir. 2008))); United States v. Strohm,
671 F.3d 1173, 1181-85 (10th Cir. 2011) (addressing both the literal truth and fundamental ambiguity
defense, and concluding that the question was not fundamentally ambiguous and Strohm's responses did

not fall within the paradigm of Bronston); United States v. DeZam, 157 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998)
("Absent fundamental ambiguity or impreciseness in the questioning, the meaning and truthfulness of
the declarant's answer is for the jury." (quoting United States v. Robbins, 997 F.2d 390, 395 (8th Cir.

1993))); United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The rule prevents an examiner
from resolving ambiguities in the elicited testimony with a perjury prosecution after the fact."); United

States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Long, 534 F.2d 1097, 1101 (3d Cir.
1976).
See DeZarn, 157 F.3d at 1049 ("A question that is truly ambiguous or which affirmatively
67.
misleads the testifier can never provide a basis for a finding of perjury, as it could never be said that one
intended to answer such a question untruthfully."). But see United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830,
841 (9th Cir. 2003) (establishing that the existence of some ambiguity in a question is not a complete

bar to a perjury charge); United States v. Williams, 552 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1977) ("If the response
given was false as the defendant understood the question, his conviction is not invalidated by the fact
that his answer to the question might generate a number of different interpretations." (citing United

States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458, 470 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1975))).
See United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("A question
68.
is fundamentally ambiguous when 'men of ordinary intelligence' cannot arrive at mutual understanding

of its meaning." (citing United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1534 (9th Cir. 1991))); see also Mark
Hsen et al., Perjury, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1537, 1547-48 (2018).
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ambiguous question is defmed at the time the question is offered as
testimony. 69
When determining if a question is fundamentally ambiguous, lower
courts look to several different factors including:
(1) the inherent vagueness-or, conversely, the inherent clarity-of
certain words and phrases, (2) the compound character of a question,
(3) the existence of defects in syntax or grammar in a question, (4)
the context of the question and answer, and (5) the defendant's own
responses to allegedly ambiguous questions.0
Lower courts citing Bronston agree that a fundamentally ambiguous
question cannot be the foundation of a perjury conviction; the rationale is
that there is no way to determine whether the defendant intended to answer
the question untruthfully, since the question has no definitive meaning."
When a court decides that it is not inherently clear if a question is
fundamentally ambiguous, the determination is left to the jury.7 2
Moreover, the jury is not permitted to infer the witness's intent to
mislead. The Supreme Court rebuked the lower court's holding that the jury
could infer Bronston's intent to mislead the questioner. According to the
Court, if a jury can infer the witness's intent to mislead, then a witness will
be posed with the task of measuring the scope of their responsibility over
the examiner's understanding of their answers.7 4 The Court in Bronston was
concerned that introducing a novel element into the current testimonial
system would neglect the policy consideration that has existed since
perjury's origins, which is "that the measures taken against the offense must
not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying." 75

See United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v.
69.
Lattimore, 127 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C. 1955)).
70.
Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1179; see also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir.
1976) (discussing the importance of context in determining whether perjury was established).

71.

See United States v. Richardson, 421 F.3d 17, 33 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Strohm, 671 F.3d

at 1179 (finding that an excessively vague question makes it impossible to know the meaning of the
question and whether the testifier intended to make a false statement).
72.
See, e.g., Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1181 ("A question is arguably ambiguous where more than
one reasonable interpretation of a question exists. . . . The 'meaning of a prosecutor's question and the
truthfulness of a defendant's answer are best left to the jury."' (quoting United States v. Farmer, 137

F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998))).
73.
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) ("A jury should not be permitted to
.

engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to
mislead or divert the examiner. .

74.
75.

Id.
Id. (quoting Study of Perjury, supra note 58, at 249).
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2. Lower Courts Moving Forward-What Juries Can Infer
After the Supreme Court in Bronston held that juries cannot infer a
defendant's intent to mislead in a perjury case,76 lower courts have
scrambled to determine what juries can infer in a perjury trial.7 Ultimately,
some courts have concluded that an ambiguous question does not guarantee
that a defendant will not be charged with or convicted of perjury.78 A perjury
conviction requires the jury to find that the defendant's answer was false.
Accordingly, some courts have ruled that a jury may determine the
defendant's objective interpretation of the question instead of the
defendant's subjective understanding. 9 In circumstances in which the
question is not precise when standing alone, the jury may consider the
context surrounding the questioning and other factors that demonstrate the
question's objective meaning.80 For example, in UnitedStates v. Culliton,s
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that it
could not consider the defendant's "unilateral reinterpretation of
questions." 82 In summary, some lower courts allow a jury to infer the
"intended meaning of a question and answer" and may do so by looking at
the context of the question and answer. 8 3
3. Unresponsive vs. Responsive Answers
In Bronston, the Supreme Court further elaborated that Bronston's
unresponsive answer could not form the basis of a perjury charge when his
answer was literally true.84 However, the Court failed to detail what type of

76.

See supranote 73 and accompanying text.

77.
See, e.g., United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Slawik,
548 F.2d 75, 85-86 (3d Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86.
78.
79.
See George W. Aycock, III, Note, Nothing but the Truth: A Solution to the Current
Inadequaciesof the Federal Perjury Statutes, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 247, 266 (1993) (citing United States

v. Fulbright, 804 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564, 567-69 (6th Cir.
1984); United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967)).
See, e.g., United States v. Camper, 384 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The context of the
80.
question and other extrinsic evidence relevant to the defendant's understanding of the question may
allow the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant understood the question as the government did
and, so understanding, answered falsely." (citing United States v. Culliton, 328 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th

Cir. 2003) (per curiam))); United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1049 (6th Cit. 1998) (determining
that the government can present evidence to demonstrate that the defendant understood the objective
meaning of the question).

328 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
81.
Id. at 1079.
82.
83.
United States v. Williams, 552 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Sainz,
772 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. McCafferty, No. 1:10CR387, 2011 WL 933771, at
*6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2011).
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973).
84.
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unresponsive answer Bronston had actually given.85 It found only that it was
the questioner's duty to recognize the unresponsive answer and to continue
asking the witness precise questions until the witness gave a responsive
answer.86
Because the Court in Bronston did not address the definition of
unresponsive answers, attorneys can turn to linguists for guidance.
According to linguists, there are multiple types of responsive and
unresponsive answers. 87 One type of unresponsive answer is an evasive,
unresponsive answer.8 8 A witness who gives an evasive, unresponsive
answer intends his response "to be irrelevant to the question posed in order
to avoid answering." 8 9 This type of response does not have any relationship
to the question, so the only way it could communicate an answer to the
question is through inferences. 90 In this situation, it is reasonable for a court
to require a questioner to react to the evasion by continuing his inquiry. 9
Other types of unresponsive answers may not be as obvious. Some
answers are superficially unresponsive; 92 a person's statement might not
appear to reply to the question, but may provide an indirect answer. 9 3 These
answers are not evasive because the intention is to offer a response rather
than to avoid the question altogether, as with evasive, unresponsive
answers. 94
Superficially unresponsive answers typically include "implicit yes/no"
responses. 9 5 In these answers, a person's unresponsive reply requires the
questioner to make an inference as to whether a witness means "yes" or
"no." 9 6 Such responses differ from evasive, unresponsive answers because
an implication is required for the answer to make sense. 9 7 Further, the
85.

See Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language ofPerjury: "Literal Truth, " Ambiguity, and the

False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373, 386 (1990) (explaining "to the extent that the
Supreme Court's decision in Bronston relates to evasive (and not merely unresponsive) replies, it
comports entirely with linguistic notions regarding communication").
86.
See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-59 (declaring that it is the questioner's burden to spot the
witness's unresponsive answer and "bring the witness back to the mark").
See generally Tiersma, supra note 85, at 386-93.
87.
88.
See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362 (speculating that Bronston's answers might not have been
"guileless but were shrewdly calculated to evade").
89.
Tiersma, supra note 85, at 386 (giving a basic example of an evasive, unresponsive reply to
a question).
90.
See id.; see also supra notes 5 & 6 (providing examples from Judge Kavanaugh's testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee).
91.
See Tiersma, supra note 85, at 386.

92.

Id. at 387-89.

93.
See id. at 388 (explaining that, after receiving a lunch invitation, a superficially unresponsive
reply might be, "I'm going to lunch with Rhonda," which clearly intends to decline the invitation).

94.

Id at 388.

95.
See id at 389 (providing that, after being asked if you own a car, an implicit yes or no answer
might be, "I have a Ford.").

96.
97.

See id
Id. at 390.
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implied answer's meaning is usually clearer than an evasive, unresponsive
answer because either a "yes" or a "no" answer can be inferred, depending
on the context of the conversation. 98 Therefore, a witness can more easily
mislead and manipulate the questioner by giving superficial, unresponsive
answers rather than by giving evasive, unresponsive answers.99
In addition, some unresponsive answers initially appear responsive.o
On the surface, these superficially responsive answers seem to address the
question, but, in reality, they leave out information in a way that is
misleading to the questioner.'"o Because these statements appear to answer
the question posed, the questioner receives no signal that he or she should
continue his inquiry.' 0 2 Accordingly, witnesses, by choosing to respond
with superficially responsive answers, have the power to dictate the course
of the questioning.
4. An Attorney's Ethical Obligation
An attorney has an ethical obligation to notify the court when he or she
knows a witness disclosed material, false information to a judge or jury,
even if the witness is the attorney's client.1 0 3 For an attorney to violate this
ethical obligation, the attorney would have to somehow know, and not
merely reasonably believe, that what the witness said was false.1 04 Unless
Bronston presented information his attorney knew was false, his attorney
had no ethical obligation to disclose the fact that Bronston's answer was
misleading under Model Rule 3.3. However, an attorney also has an ethical
obligation to never "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation." 0 5 Further, under the duty of confidentiality, "[a]
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client gives informed consent."1 06 Therefore, attorneys must tread
the line between fulfilling their obligation to their clients and ensuring that
witnesses do not mislead judges and juries.

See id. (explaining that "there is little room for doubt about the meaning of the implied
98.
communication: 'yes' or 'no,' as the case may be").
99.
Id. at 391 (noting that "[b]ecause the implication is often so strong and unambiguous, this
type of response is a convenient mechanism for deception").

100.
101.

See generally id. at 391-93.
Id.at391-92.

102. See id at 392 (arguing that superficially responsive statements do not trigger a questioner's
acuity).
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018) ("Ifa lawyer . .
has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including . . . disclosure to the tribunal.").

104.

Id

105.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).

106.

Id. r. 1.6(a).
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C. Silence, Omissions, and the Law
1. When Silence Has Legal Meaning
In certain legal contexts, silence has the same meaning as a verbal
statement. In the field of contracts, a court can confer acceptance of an offer
when the offeree is silent or does not act. 07 For instance, in Wadsworth v.
New York Life Insurance, Co., 08 a court found that an insurance company
accepted an offer for a life insurance policy application because it failed to
reject the application within a reasonable time.1 09 Similarly, under the
Second Restatement of Contracts, prior dealings "between the parties may
give the offeror reason to understand that silence will constitute
acceptance."'10

Silence and inaction can even be the basis of a perjury conviction in the
voir dire context. In People v. Meza,"' the defendant was charged with
perjury for failing to raise his hand and thereby notify the court that he knew
the defendant during jury selection." 2 Before voir dire began, the court clerk
had administered an oath to all the potential jurors." 3 Later, when the jurors
were asked if they knew the defendant, one juror verbally acknowledged
that he knew the defendant, and another juror raised his hand to indicate that
he also knew the defendant.1 4 The judge spoke briefly to these jurors and
then asked if anyone else knew the defendant."' A third juror, Meza, failed
to indicate, either verbally or by raising his hand, that he knew the
defendant, even though the defendant was his brother-in-law."' While the
trial court set aside Meza's perjury charge, the California Court of Appeals
reversed," 7 finding that Meza's silence could constitute a false statement
and thus make him liable for perjury."'
Additionally, silence can serve multiple uses under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under the Federal Rules
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (listing instances
in which an offer may be accepted through silence or inaction).

108.

84 N.w.2d 513 (Mich. 1957).

109. See id. at 517-18 (noting that Michigan is in the minority of states that require insurance
companies to reject within a reasonable time).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. d.

111.
112.

234 Cal. Rptr. 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
See id. at 235-36.

113. Id. ("By the terms of the oath the jurors promised to answer 'well and truly' questions
concerning their qualifications to act as trial jurors.").

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 236.
Id
Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 245.

118. See id at 243 (examining the definitions of "conduct" and "statement" in the state Evidence
Code and finding that both include nonverbal behaviors and actions).
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of Civil Procedure, there are several common defenses that defendants must
assert either in a motion or in the responsive pleading to a complaint, or the
defendant waives his or her right to assert any of the defenses." 9 Similarly,
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, silence can have multiple uses.12 0 First,
silence can be used as an adoptive admission, which constitutes an
exception to the hearsay rule. 12 1 In United States v. Duval,122 the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit articulated a three-part test for
determining when a party's silence may be used as an adoptive admission. 12 3
Under this test, a party's agreement with another's statement can be inferred
"when (i) a statement is made in a party's presence, (ii) the nature of the
statement is such that it normally would induce the party to respond, and
(iii) the party nonetheless fails to take exception." 1 2 4
Second, silence can be used for impeachment purposes. 12 5 In Raffel v.
United States,1 26 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's choice not to
take the stand in his defense at his first trial could be used on crossexamination when he chose to take the stand during his retrial. 1 27
Nevertheless, the use of silence as impeachment evidence is limited to
particular circumstances. 12 8 Finally, in civil cases, juries can use the
defendant's decision not to take the stand to infer liability.12 9 Thus, silence
can have a variety of legal consequences.

119.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)-(5) (listing the waivable objections); see also FED. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(1) (noting that a party waives any defense listed in 12(b)(2}-5) when the party fails to include "it
in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1)").

120.

See generally Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little:

Reassessing the Probative Value ofSilence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 22-27 (2008) (describing the
evidentiary use of silence).
121. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (declaring that an opposing party's statement is not hearsay
if it "is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true").

122.

496 F.3d 64(1st Cir. 2007).

123.

See Duval, 496 F.3d at 76 (explaining the evolution of the test within First Circuit case law);

see also People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282, 1294-95 (Cal. 1990) (upholding the admission of the
defendant's silence in response to his sister's question, "Why did you have to shoot those three poor
boys?" as a valid adoptive admission).

124.

Duval, 469 F.3d at 76 (quoting United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2007)).

125.

See Thompson, supra note 120, at 24.

126.
127.
128.

271 U.S. 494 (1926).
Id. at 497.
See, e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421-23 (1957) (finding that a

defendant's choice not to take the stand during grandjuryproceedings could not be used to impeach his
testimony when he took the stand at trial because "no implication of guilt could be drawn" from his prior
silence).

129.

See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,320 (1976) (holding that permitting a civil jury

to draw adverse inferences from a prisoner's silence at a disciplinary hearing does not violate the Fifth
Amendment).
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2. Statutes in Which Silence and/or Omissions Can Lead to Conviction
A defendant's silence and/or omission may lead to a criminal conviction
under certain statutes, such as those criminalizing false statements and
obstruction ofjustice. The elements of the federal false statement statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1001,30 are falsity, materiality, and intent.131 False statements are
similar to perjury, as the two crimes share the above elements.132 The key
difference between false statements and perjury is that perjury requires a
defendant to be under oath and the statement to be relevant to the matter at
hand, while a false statement does not require the defendant to be under
oath.133 Under the false statement statute, the defendant must only be
making a false statement to a branch of the government regardless of
relevance to a specific matter.13 4
Defendants have the capacity to commit false statements by omission.1 3 5
A defendant makes a culpable omission when he or she purposefully omits
material information with knowing and willful intent.1 36 For example, in
13 7
the defendant was subpoenaed to bring in his
United States v. Larranaga,
company's records, including minutes from board meetings, for purposes of
a grand jury investigation.1 3 8 While testimony indicated that the executive
director of Health and Human Services was present at numerous board
130.
131.

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
See id.; see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 515-23 (1995) (asserting that, in a

federal false statement case, the issue of materiality must be submitted to a jury to consider).

132.
133.

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
Compare § 1001, with § 1621. See Daniel Engber, How Many Ways Can You Say "Lie"?,

SLATE (Mar. 7, 2007, 2:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news andpolitics/recycled/2007/03/ho
w_manywayscan you say lie.html [https://perma.cc/5G97-L6KL] (illustrating the differences
between perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice in the context of the 1. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby conviction).
134. Engber, supra note 133.

135.

See, e.g.. United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 71, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) (upholding a false

statement conviction for concealing information on a refugee application); United States v. Larranaga,

787 F.2d 489, 498 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding a false statement conviction for knowingly submitting
false board meeting minutes to a grand jury); United States v. Stephens, 779 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir.
1985) (affirming a false statement conviction on the basis of the defendant's omission of loans from his

financial statement); United States v. Walsh, 119 F.3d 115, 117-19 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the
trial court was correct in convicting the defendant of making a false statement when he failed to disclose
a pre-existing loan and home equity line of credit on a home mortgage application); United States v.
Rapoport, 545 F.2d 802, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding conviction in a false statement case involving

omissions of finder's fees); Robinson v. United States, 345 F.2d 1007, 1009-11 (10th Cir. 1965)
(affirming the defendant's conviction in a false statement case involving the defendant's failure to
disclose liabilities on a loan application).

136.

See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (defining the requisite

mens rea as making a statement knowing that it was false or acting with a conscious disregard for the
truth or with the purpose of avoiding ascertaining the truth).

137.

787 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1986).

138. See Larranaga,787 F.2d at 492-93 (noting that, because the grand jury investigation heavily
involved the executive director of the Department of Health and Human Services, the court was
particularly interested in his presence at particular board meetings).
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meetings, the minutes that the defendant provided indicated that the
executive director had only attended one.1 39 Because the defendant not only
omitted the executive director's attendance at the board meetings in the
meeting notes, but also failed to report his attendance verbally, the court
found him guilty of making a false statement. 14 0
A defendant may commit obstruction of justice by omission as well.
Under the federal obstruction of justice omnibus provision, 18 U.S.C. §
1503, the government must show that a judicial proceeding was pending,
the defendant knew or had notice of the proceeding, and that the defendant
acted, or attempted to act, corruptly with the intent to interfere with the
proceeding.141
Obstruction ofjustice and perjury typically work in conjunction with one
another because a defendant almost always meets the requirements of both
when he or she lies about an important topic under oath.1 4 2 However,
obstruction of justice encompasses a wider array of conduct than perjury
does, as a defendant does not have to be under oath to commit obstruction
of justice and can be guilty of obstruction of justice due to any act that
hampers an ongoing case. 14 3 Furthernore, a defendant cannot use the literal
44
truth as an affirmative defense to obstruction ofjustice.1
Due to the broad nature of obstruction of justice, prosecutors can utilize
the charge in a multitude of situations. For example, a defendant may
obstruct justice by concealing pertinent information in such a way that
misleads the prosecution.145 In People v. Williams,14 6 the New York
defendant was convicted of hindering prosecution (a state crime related to
obstruction of justice) when she failed to disclose that she personally knew
the perpetrator of a robbery that she reported.1 47 Courts have also found that
failing to divulge aliases during an arrest,' 4 8 misleading a probation officer

139. Id.
140. Id. at 494.
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012) (providing the federal statute for the obstruction of justice
omnibus clause); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1989) (identifying these "three
core elements that the government must establish to prove a violation of the omnibus clause of section

1503").
142. See, e.g., Engber, supra note 133.
143. See Engber, supra note 133; Mark Mermelstein & Charlotte Decker, Walk the Line, L.A.
LAW., Dec. 2006, at 27, 28 (explaining that "any actions can constitute obstruction if done with the
requisite intent").
144. See Mermelstein & Decker, supra note 143, at 31.

145.
146.
147.
148.

See, e.g., People v. Williams, 795 N.Y.S.2d 561, 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
795 N.Y.S.2d 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
Id. at 566.
See, e.g., United States v. Odedina, 980 F.2d 705, 706-07 (11th Cir. 1993).

286

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:267

by not providing a complete list of past convictions, 14 9 and omitting home
ownership in a financial statement give rise to obstruction ofjustice.150
While perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice share many
attributes, the federal perjury statute, as it currently stands, makes it
seemingly impossible for defendants to commit perjury by omission.
II. THE NEED TO EXPAND FEDERAL PERJURY LAW TO COUNTER WILY
WITNESSES

A. The Literal Truth Loophole
The Supreme Court's holding in Bronston provides "wily witness[es]"i5
with an opportunity to provide misleading, albeit literally truthful, answers
under oath.15 2 While the Bronston Court correctly placed the burden on the
questioner to formulate precise questions, 15 3 there are still instances where
a witness can artfully mislead the questioner with a literally true answer to
an unambiguous question. Sometimes, these answers can even materially
alter the outcome of the case.
For example, a defendant may strategically choose to address his or her
own interpretation of a question as opposed to what he or she knows is the
common interpretation of the question.1 5 4 In choosing to answer his
subjective interpretation of a question, the defendant may knowingly
withhold material facts. UnitedStates v. Eddy 15 ' exemplifies this point. The
defendant, Eddy, was originally convicted of perjury because he said "no"
when a questioner asked him if he had contacted the Navy Medical
Recruiters claiming to have an "official" medical degree-proven by his
submission of an official transcript and official diploma.1 56 On appeal, the
defendant used his subjective understanding of the word "official"-i.e.,
that his documents had not been falsified-rather than the contextual
meaning of the word-i.e., that the documents were authentic and had been
issued by duly authorized personnel.' Based on Eddy's interpretation, he
did not commit perjury, as he denied submitting a document, which had not
been falsified. Because the literal truth defense allows defendants to answer
questions based on their own subjective interpretation of words and phrases,
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See, e.g., United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 903-04 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973).
Id. at 362.
Id.

154.

See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing unresponsive vs. responsive answers).

155.
156.

737 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 565--66.

157. See id. at 569 (identifying that Eddy's subjective interpretation of the word "official" meant
documents that were not falsified).
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the defendant was ultimately able to escape his perjury conviction."' While
the questioner bears the burden of asking follow-up questions, the
questioner likely had no reason to know that the defendant's response
hinged on his own interpretation of the word "official."
Similarly, President Bill Clinton avoided a perjury conviction based on
statements he made during the Paula Jones lawsuit.1 5 9 During a deposition,
the questioner provided President Clinton with a written definition of the
term "sexual relations."' When asked about his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky, he used his subjective interpretation of the provided definition to
claim that he never had a sexual relationship with her.' 6 ' This illustrates how
a defendant can successfully take advantage of the literal truth defense even
when the questioner does his due diligence in clearing any ambiguity in his
questions and asking follow-up questions.1 62
In these instances, the questioners asked clear and unambiguous
questions, yet the defendants still avoided conviction under the federal
perjury statutes because their answers were literally true based on their
subjective interpretation of the questions. Like in Eddy, there are situations
in which nothing within the defendant's response signals the need for
follow-up questions because there is only one clear objective meaning of
the question. Furthermore, in situations like President Clinton's deposition,
a questioner may continue to ask clarifying questions to no avail. The
questioner may fulfill his or her obligation by providing definitions and
follow-up questions and still not elicit the desired response. At a certain
point, a questioner needs to move on in an inquiry without getting a
completely truthful response-sometimes without realizing that the
defendant was trying to evade providing the complete truth.
158.

Id.

159. See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, The Senate Acquits President Clinton, WASH. POST (Feb.
13, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/impeach021399.ht
m [https://perma.cc/AW8Q-LX2U] (explaining that the Senate acquitted President Clinton of perjury
charges relating to the Paula Jones lawsuit).
160. See President Clinton 's Deposition, supra note 8. The Paula Jones legal team submitted the
following definition of "sexual relations":
For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in "sexual relations" when the person
knowingly engages in or causes - (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; (2)
contact between any part of the person's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another
person; or (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and any part of another
person's body. "Contact" means intentional touching, either directly or through clothing.

Id.
161.

Id

162. See id. The questioner asked President Clinton multiple follow-up questions, such as: "[d]id
you have an extramarital sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky"; "[i]f she told someone that she had a
sexual affair with you beginning in November of 1995, would that be a lie"; and "so the record is
completely clear, have you ever had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term is defined in

Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the Court?" Id.
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Because the Bronston Court broadly included all unresponsive answers
within the literal truth defense without addressing the different types of
unresponsive answers, it created a loophole for witnesses, allowing them to
give unresponsive, but literally true answers and evade perjury. This is
detrimental to the purpose of the perjury statute because a defendant can use
unresponsive answers to create false inferences. A witness whose answer is
evasively unresponsive intends for his or her answer to "be irrelevant to the
question posed in order to avoid answering."l 6 3 Conversely, a superficially
unresponsive answer appears to avoid the question but does provide an
answer on a deeper level. 164 Further, a responsive but incomplete answer
provides some information without fully answering the question asked.1 65
Under Bronston, none of these responses can be used for a perjury charge if
the words were literally true, even if they impliedly create false statements.
By oversimplifying what an unresponsive answer is, the Court has narrowed
perjury's falsity requirement, such that it does not include false inferences.
Measures should be taken to remedy this literal truth loophole.
B. Perfury by Omission
The concept of perjury by omission would remedy the literal truth
loophole. A defendant would commit perjury by omission when his or her
response to an unambiguous question omits information with the intent to
create false inferences about an outcome-determinative fact. Justice
Kavanaugh and President Clinton might have faced perjury charges if the
federal perjury statutes had provided for perjury by omission because they
omitted material information that the questioners were seeking to elicit even
when they were asked unambiguous questions.1 6 6
In Bronston, the Court tried to balance perjury's purpose of ensuring that
witnesses testify truthfully with protecting witnesses from standards that
would discourage them from testifying. 16 7 However, the Court's reasoning
gave too much weight to standards that protect witnesses at the expense of
the perjury statute's ultimate purpose. Defendants such as Eddy and
President Clinton illustrate the Court's failure to appropriately balance these
competing interests by avoiding perjury charges.' 6 8 To readjust the scales,

163. See Tiersma, supra note 85, at 386 (defining evasive unresponsive responses); see, e.g.,
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1973) (demonstrating how a "wily witness" can
mislead the questioner by responding with an evasive answer).
164. See Tiersma, supra note 85, at 387-89 (defining superficially unresponsive answers).
165. See id. at 391-92 (defining superficially responsive but materially incomplete answers).
166. See Baker & Dewar, supra note 159; Sullivan, supra note 4.
167. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (highlighting "that the measures taken against the
offense must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying").
168. See supra Part II.A (describing the Eddy case and the President Clinton deposition).
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Congress should rewrite the federal perjury statutes to address witnesses
who commit perjury by omission.
The addition of perjury by omission would not completely alter the
current federal perjury landscape. Rather, it would expand the falsity
requirement to include intentionally misleading or incomplete statements in
very limited circumstances. The other elements of perjury-such as oath,
materiality, and intent-would remain the same. Under the Court's current
literal truth analysis, statements are analyzed for their truth alone, regardless
of how the elements of perjury interact with each other.16 9 The Court ignores
the language of the statute that indicates that it is not whether a statement is
completely true but whether the defendant believed it was true. The
amended statute would not defeat the literal truth defense but instead leave
courts with the opportunity to take a deeper look at the defendant's intent.
Defendants would still be able to use the literal truth defense because there
would still be circumstances in which a questioner did not ask precise
enough questions, or when a defendant merely misunderstood a question
and provided what he or she thought was the correct, truthful answer.
Moreover, this statute would honor policy considerations, such as
protecting witnesses from standards that would discourage them from
testifying because it would still require intent. By incorporating perjury by
omission into the federal perjury statute, the truth or falsity of a statement
would be judged by whether a defendant believed what he or she said was
70
true and whether he or she said it willingly or knowingly.
1. What Juries Would Be Able to Infer
Under the amended perjury statute, juries would be judging whether a
defendant believed what he or she said was true and whether he or she said
it willingly or knowingly. Juries traditionally infer intent;171 this would not
change in the context of perjury. The jury would be inferring the defendant's
intent to mislead by determining whether the defendant objectively
understood what the question meant but chose to answer the question based
169. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (explaining that "[a] jury should not
be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was
intended to mislead or divert the examiner"); see also United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d
Cir. 1977) (reasoning that if Slawik's answer was "literally true, there was no offense, even if Slawik's
answer was deliberately misleading," because "[t]o hold otherwise . . . would allow defendants to be
convicted for immaterial falsehoods or for 'intent to mislead' or 'perjury by implication'-which
Bronston specifically prohibited").
170. See infra Part II.C.2 (providing a model perjury statute that includes language for perjury by
omission).
171. See generally Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value
of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979) (providing a background on the use of permissive
inferences in criminal contexts).
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on his or her subjective understanding of it. While it is important that
questioners aim to ask unambiguous questions, witnesses, defendants, or
deponents such as Judge Kavanaugh, Eddy, and President Clinton have
shown that even words such as "blacking out," "official," and "sexual
relations" are arguably ambiguous.1 7 2 In fact, in the legal world, any word
may be considered ambiguous,1 7 3 which is why some courts have reinforced
that juries may infer a defendant's objective understanding of a question.1 7 4
If a jury may determine a defendant's objective understanding of a
question,'17 then the jury is virtually determining that the defendant chose
to ignore that understanding of the question and answer it based on his or
her subjective interpretation in order to mislead the questioner. The jury
would be deducing that the defendant conveniently interpreted a question in
a manner that allows him or her to provide an answer that may seem
responsive but is actually evasive and communicates something contrary to
the truth. Intent is an element of perjury, so by making this determination,
the jury would be fulfilling its fact-finding duties and could take various
factors into consideration, such as the defendant's level of education.
2. Omissions in Other Contexts as Support
Perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice are interconnected
and often overlap.1 76 Further, the differences among perjury, false
statements, and obstruction ofjustice are sparse.1 7 7 There are circumstances
in which a defendant's omission may lead to a criminal conviction for false
statements, obstruction of justice, and fraud.1 8 Therefore, the federal
perjury statutes should leave room for omissions as well.
Because false statement and perjury charges are similar, a defendant who
is charged with one should also be charged with the other. For example, the
79
defendant in Larranaga,1
who made a false statement by omission at a
172. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text (discussing literal truth and the questioner's
acuity); supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Kavanaugh); notes 155-58 and
accompanying text (discussing Eddy); notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing President
Clinton).

173.
(S.D.N.Y.

174.
175.

See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
1960) (arguing about what constitutes a "chicken" for the purpose of a contract).

Savik. 548 F.2d at 86.
Id. at 85-86.

176. See supra notes 130-34, 142 and accompanying text (highlighting how defendants are often
charged with some combination of perjury, false statements, and obstruction ofjustice).

177.

Compare 18 U.S.C.

§

1001 (2012), with

§ 18

U.S.C. 1621 (2012) (illustrating that the major

difference between the false statement statute and the perjury statute is that perjury requires that the
defendant be under oath). See, e.g., Engber, supra note 133 (explaining that former vice-presidential
aide Lewis Libby's perjury, false statement, and obstruction charges for deceiving investigators and a
grand jury are based on similar statutes that often apply to identical fact patterns).

178.
179.

Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1621, and§ 1623(a), with 18 U.S.C.
United States v. Larranaga, 787 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1986).

§

1001.
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grand jury hearing when he failed to disclose that a material person was
present at numerous meetings, 8 0 should have been charged with both
making a false statement and perjury by omission. Further, just as the
defendant in Larranaga intentionally led a grand jury to believe that a
material person was not present at certain meetings,' 8 1 a defendant could
intentionally lead a jury to believe that a material person was not present in
a room in which serious criminal activity occurred. In this instance, the
questioner might direct the defendant, who is testifying under oath, to name
everyone who was in a specific room on the night the criminal activity
occurred. The defendant may then name three people, when four people
were actually present in the room. At this point, the attorney would have
done everything in his power to determine exactly what occurred in that
room that night and who was there, especially if every other witness
testifying or explaining the events of that night also failed to disclose the
fourth person present. In that case, the questioner would have no reason to
believe that there was a fourth person in the room that night, and because
the defendant provided a responsive answer, the questioner fulfilled his duty
to press for material information during an inquiry and would not be alerted
to ask more questions.' 82 Therefore, the witness who testified about three,
rather than four, people present in the room could be convicted of perjury
by omission.
Additionally, perjury is also similar to obstruction of justice.8 3 A
defendant should be able to be charged with committing perjury by
omission just as a defendant could commit obstruction of justice by
omission. In Williams, the defendant obstructed justice when she reported a
crime but failed to disclose that she knew the perpetrator's identity.1 8 4 A
questioner in a perjury by omission case may have more reason to know
information, such as a witness's relationship to a perpetrator, than a
questioner in an obstruction of justice by omission case. However, a witness
could still fail to disclose pertinent information under oath. For example, a
first-hand witness to a crime may consistently withhold exculpatory
evidence that investigators or attorneys would never have any access to.
Investigators and attorneys might not have any other way of learning of this
exculpatory evidence because only the witness observed the crime taking
place. If during trial and under oath that witness provides literally truthful

180.
181.
182.

Id. at 493.
Id.
See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973).

183. See Mermelstein & Decker, supra note 143, at 31 (explaining that the major differences
between obstruction of justice and perjury are that any action can constitute obstruction of justice, and
a defendant may not use the literal truth as an affirmative defense to a charge of obstruction of justice).

184.

People v. Williams, 795 N.Y.S.2d 561, 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).

292

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:267

and responsive answers yet continues to omit the exculpatory evidence, the
witness could have committed perjury by omission.
Ultimately, in order to charge a defendant with perjury by omission, the
defendant would have to be under oath. Further, a defendant would commit
perjury by omission only in rare instances when the questioner has no reason
to know the material information that the defendant is withholding and
nothing about the defendant's answers signal the attorney to ask clarifying
questions. Because of these restraints, a defendant is less likely to be
charged with perjury by omission than to be charged with making a false
statement or obstruction of justice. Yet the option should still be available.
Because of perjury's similarities to these statutes, defendants should be able
to be convicted of perjury by omission as well.
3. Ethical Obligations
A defendant who omits a material fact under oath presents serious ethical
issues for his or her attorney. An attorney violates his or her ethical
obligation when he or she fails to disclose that one of the witnesses provided
the court with false information during testimony.18 5 While under this
obligation, an attorney does not have to disclose that the witness provided a
literally true, yet misleading answer to the court, the attorney faces an
ethical predicament if this misleading answer becomes a material reason
why the court makes its ultimate decision. For example, in Bronston, if the
Court had explicitly said that "the basis of our decision is Bronston's
convincing testimony that he does not have an international bank account,"
the attorney could face ethical repercussions if the case was appealed. In
that circumstance, the attorney could not use the basis of the lower court's
decision in his or her favor because the outcome-determining statement is
false, and the attorney would be obligated to clarify the statement if it is
brought up on appeal.
Similarly, under Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
an attorney may not involve himself or herself in dishonest, fraudulent, or
deceptive behavior.1 86 One way an attorney may become involved in such
behavior is by permitting a client to mislead a court or a jury by omitting
material information. For example, if Bronston's attorney had advised him
to utilize the literal truth, the attorney may have been subject to ethical
review under Rule 8.4. Similarly, if an attorney is under oath, he or she may
violate rule 8.4 by omitting material information in order to mislead thejury
or the court. Therefore, literally truthful, intentional, and outcome-

185.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).

186.

Id. r. 8.4(c).
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determinative omissions, whether by an attorney or one of his or her
witnesses, could implicate an attorney's ethical obligation.
C. Revising the FederalPerjury Statutes
1. State Statutes and Perjury by Omission
State legislatures and courts have demonstrated a willingness to expand
perjury statutes and case law to include perjury by omission. In fact, some
states' perjury statutes explicitly contain language referencing incomplete
or misleading testimony. 187 Meanwhile, other state courts have found
omissions to be the basis of perjury even where their statutes seemingly
require a verbal statement.'8
South Carolina's perjury statute explicitly encompasses "incomplete"
and "misleading" testimony. The statute states that "[i]t is unlawful for a
person to wilfully give false, misleading, or incomplete testimony under
oath in any court of record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory
proceeding in this State."l 89 Because a statement can be the basis of a
perjury charge in South Carolina if it is "false, misleading, or incomplete,"
a literally true but unresponsive answer could qualify as perjury because it
is an incomplete answer and could create a negative implication.
Oklahoma's perjury statute leaves room for perjury by omission in its
mens rea requirement. The statute provides that a statement is perjury if it
is made under oath when the witness "does not believe that the statement is
true or knows that it is not true or intends thereby to avoid or obstruct the
ascertainment of the truth."l 90 Although the statute explicitly allows for a
literal truth defense,19 ' the mens rea element could allow juries to decide
whether the witness intended to mislead the questioner. Oklahoma case law
92
has considered "suppression of the truth" as a basis for a perjury charge.1
These cases illustrate how the language of Oklahoma's perjury statute could
allow for convictions when a witness intends to suppress the truth with a
literally truthful but unresponsive answer.
187. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10(A)(1) (1993).
188. See, e.g., People v. Meza, 234 Cal. Rptr. 235, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that silence
can amount to a perjury charge).
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10(A)(1).
190. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 491 (West 1965).
191. See id. (declaring that "[i]t shall be a defense to the charge of perjury as defined in this section
that the statement is true").
192. See Ostendorf v. State, 128 P. 143, 154 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (explaining that, "[w]hen a
person is placed in a position where it is his duty to tell the entire truth, and he willfully suppresses part
of it, this is just as criminal in morals and in law as an affirmative statement of a falsehood"); see also
Flowers v. State, 163 P. 558, 559 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917) (upholding a conviction for perjury on the
grounds that "under ... oath no man has the right to willfully, knowingly, and corruptly suppress any
part of the truth, material to the issue, concerning which he is questioned").
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While the plain language of California's perjury statute does not appear
to leave room for perjury by omission, 193 there have been instances where
California courts have upheld perjury convictions based on omissions. For
example, in People v. Meza,1 9 4 the defendant was convicted of perjury for
failing to raise his hand to notify the court that he knew the defendant during
jury selection. 195 In convicting the defendant, the court departed from prior
state precedent that said silence could never constitute perjury.1 9 6 Under
specific circumstances, such as the collective jury selection process where
silence is understood to mean "no," a defendant's silence could express a
negative statement, which could serve as the basis of a perjury conviction.' 97
States like South Carolina, Oklahoma, and California have responded to
the need to limit the literal truth defense through statutes and case law.
These responses are the states' attempts to close the literal truth loophole,
which created an overly simplified defense to a complicated offense.
2. Model Statute and Jury Instructions
Congress should follow suit and amend the federal perjury statute to
combat the literal truth loophole and ensure that courts can convict
defendants for perjury by omission. Using language from the South
Carolina19 8 and Oklahoma 99 perjury statutes, this federal perjury statute
could read as follows:
Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification,
or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746
of title 28, United States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary
to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any
false, misleading, or incomplete testimony and intends thereby to
avoid or obstruct the ascertainment of the truth, makes or uses any
other information, including any book, paper, document, record,
recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any false
material declaration or omission, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

193. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(a) (West 1990) (stating that a person commits perjury if, under
oath, he "willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he .. . knows to be
false").

194.
195.
196.

234 Cal. Rptr. 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 235 -36.
See id. at 242-43 (expressly rejecting People v. French, 26 P.2d 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933));

see also supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (providing factual details of the Meza case).

197.
198.
199.

Meza, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-10(A)(1) (1993).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 491 (West 1965).
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The amended statute would require a prosecutor to comport with the twowitness rule and still allow a witness to recant his or her statement. 200 in
addition, defendants could still use a narrowed literal truth defense.20 1
In a case in which a prosecuting attorney is arguing that the defendant
committed perjury by omission, proper jury instructions would include a
reading of the amended federal perjury statute, breaking down each element
that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 2 The judge would then
elaborate on the necessary elements. For example, the judge might define
"material" as something that can be outcome-determinative, even if it did
not actually impact the outcome of the case at hand. After reading the statute
and describing the elements, the judge would list the statements and/or
omissions in dispute, explaining that the defendant cannot be guilty unless
the jury unanimously agrees on which statements or omissions ran afoul of
the statute. The judge would still give jurors instructions regarding the
recantation and literal truth defenses.
CONCLUSION
Perjury, as it currently stands, permits sophisticated deponents or
witnesses, such as President Clinton and Judge Kavanaugh, as well as
defendants and others who testify, an opportunity to omit facts without
facing perjury charges. The Supreme Court solidified this position in its
Bronston decision, which created the literal truth defense-a perjury
loophole used by "wily witness[es]" to mislead juries with half-truths. 203
The literal truth defense is uncontained and delegitimizes the purpose of the
perjury statute.
Congress should close this loophole by amending the federal perjury
statute to criminalize those who intentionally provide incomplete and
misleading testimony under oath. Amending the federal perjury statute to
fill this gap would prevent shrewd defendants from exploiting this
technicality. Statutes that are similar to perjury, such as false statements and
obstruction of justice, have been successful in criminalizing omissions in
certain circumstances, demonstrating that perjury can do the same.
This revision to the perjury statute would require courts and juries to take
a broader look at the context surrounding a defendant's statement or lack
thereof to determine whether the defendant meant to mislead the questioner
with his or her omissions. The statute would still protect witnesses and
200. See supra Part 1.A.2 (explaining the two-witness rule and recantation requirements).
201. See supra Part II.A (setting guidelines for when the literal truth defense is applicable under
the amended federal perjury statute).
202. See supra Part II.C.2 (providing the amended federal perjury statute).

203.

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973).
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encourage honest testimony, as it would not criminalize mistakes or
misunderstandings. Although the perjury statute would be broader, it would
still include common protections for witnesses, such as the recantation
defense and the two-witness rule, thus protecting individuals from being
prosecuted for making an honest mistake.

